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Abstract 
This study incorporates insights from research on group decision-making and trust repair to investigate 
the differences that arise when alleged transgressors attempt to regain the trust of groups as compared to 
individuals. Results indicate that repairing trust is generally more difficult with groups than individuals, 
and both groups and individuals were less trusting when trustees denied culpability (rather than 
apologized) for a competence-based violation or apologized (rather than denied culpability) for an 
integrity-based violation. However, the interaction of violation-type and violation-response also 
ultimately affected the relative difficulty of repairing trust with groups vs. individuals, with the greater 
harshness of groups dissipating when the transgressors’ responses were effectively matched with the type 
of violation. Persuasive argumentation rather than normative pressure, furthermore, mediated these 
differences. Thus, the sequencing of individual vs. group assessments mattered, such that subsequent 
group assessments affected initial individual assessments but not the reverse. 
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“A collectivity has its own ways of thinking and feeling to which its members bend but which are 
different from those they would create if they were left to their own devices.”  
(Durkheim, 1886: 1973, p. 17). 
 
Introduction 
Trust is important in many, if not most, workplace interactions because individuals and groups can often 
benefit by relying on other parties. Yet trust, which we define in accordance with past research 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998) as a willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another, is also fragile and easily threatened or broken. 
Consequently, organizational actors sometimes experience trust violations arising from actual, suspected, 
or rumored transgressions or even simple accusations. Stories of trust violations abound in the media and 
business press. However, these high-profile incidents are vastly outnumbered by the many trust violations 
that occur in the offices and hallways and other arenas of virtually all work organizations. These 
“everyday” occurrences may not be considered newsworthy, or perhaps as common as when trust is 
actually honored, but they are certainly noteworthy. And when trust breaks down, the very cooperation 
and interdependence that are the mainstays of organizational functioning become threatened. 
 
In recognition of the simultaneous importance and fragility of trust, a burgeoning literature on trust repair 
has emerged which investigates repair from the perspective of accused parties (trustees) and from the 
perspective of their perceivers (trustors). When trust is violated, the positive expectations regarding the 
trustee(s) decrease or become negative. Thus, trust repair entails repairing damaged expectations (Kramer 
& Lewicki, 2010). For trustees, various trust repair tactics have been found to be effective, including 
apologies (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004), promises 
(Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006), denials (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004), and substantive 
acts such as penance, regulation, and reparation (Bottom et al., 2002, Desmet et al., 2011, Dirks et al., 
2011, Lount et al., 2008), although the efficacy of these strategies often depends on specific 
characteristics of the violation. For trustors, judgments about trustworthiness after a violation can be 
biased toward the conclusion that trust is not deserved if cognitive processing of information is 
incomplete (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007). Moreover, recent theoretical work has discussed how 
trustors can facilitate or inhibit the rebuilding of trust through an iterative process (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 
2009), including being cognizant of emotions such as anger and fear that can affect how information 
about the trustee is interpreted (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). 
 
Although this body of research has substantially enhanced our understanding of trust repair, the picture is 
far from complete. In particular, we note that in all the existing research on trust repair, the focus has been 
on how isolated individuals evaluate and respond to trust repair efforts. In contrast, in organizations, trust 
violation and repair episodes frequently involve a social element, including cases in which groups 
evaluate individuals, which is the focus of our study. Research on organizational gossip reveals how both 
trust and distrust can be spread and amplified, for example, as subordinates discuss among themselves 
how they should react to a manager’s violation of company policy or industry standard, teams discuss 
how they should react to a member’s alleged free-riding, and supervisors meet to discuss how they should 
react to a subordinate’s alleged incompetence (e.g., Burt & Knez, 1996). Organizations also formally 
appoint groups to gather information and form judgments for purposes such as performance appraisal, 
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hiring, and complaint resolution (Cantano, Darr, & Campbell, 2007) – situations in which concerns 
regarding trustworthiness and alleged trust violations tend to be salient. Thus, even if isolated individuals 
make some trust judgments in organizations, many if not most trust judgments are influenced by the 
social context. In other words, such judgments are often made by groups. Furthermore, the surfacing of 
trust-related concerns within organizations often sets in motion complex dynamics, as individual 
judgments are preceded or followed by group judgments, that can materially affect the final trust 
judgments that are made. 
 
Since the social context often plays an important role in trust judgments after a violation, we need to 
understand its implications. Our objectives, therefore, are to develop and test hypotheses that explore how 
groups might differ from individuals in their judgments of an alleged violator’s trustworthiness, and 
understand the social processes driving these differences, by focusing on how the dynamics of group 
polarization might affect the key judgmental processes of trust repair after a violation is alleged to have 
occurred. The paper thus seeks to provide theoretical insight and an impetus for future work, by 
introducing the role of the social context and by integrating group dynamics into current trust repair 
frameworks. 
 
In this study, we focus on situations in which parties have had limited prior interaction and/or the 
relationship is in the emergent stages, as opposed to a relationship with a long history. This is based on 
the recognition that people can exhibit surprisingly high levels of initial trust in those with whom they 
have not had a history of interaction (e.g., due to their individual dispositions to trust, beliefs in laws and 
regulations, reputations, affiliations, and stereotypes) and that such high initial trust can be quite fragile 
due to the tentative and assumption-based nature of its antecedents (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 
1998). Due to this focus, our inquiry may not capture the full range of considerations that may pertain to 
trust repair in more closely knit relationships. We, nevertheless, focus on such early interactions due to 
their importance for defining the nature and quality of the future relationship, and because the kinds of 
mechanisms under investigation are likely to play at least some role in longer-term relations as well. 
 
This study is, furthermore, based on evidence that this high initial trust can be damaged even by 
unsubstantiated allegations and with those who have not been directly harmed (e.g., Ferrin et al., 2007, 
Kim et al., 2004). Thus, rather than limit the scope of trust violations to those who have been directly 
harmed by a transgression, we recognize that individuals can learn through inference and/or observation 
(Bandura, 1986) and that this can make a broader array of parties less willing to make themselves 
vulnerable to an alleged violator than they would have been had that allegation not occurred. This 
situation broadens the implications of, and subsequent need to repair, trust violations to a much wider 
group of bystanders, as well as those only hearing about such allegations well after the fact. 
 
Groups vs. individuals 
Research has shown that groups can often reach very different decisions than individuals. Indeed, the 
literature has observed that, for many types of tasks, groups have the potential to outperform the average 
of their individual members (e.g., Laughlin, Bonner, & Miner, 2002). However, an array of problems can 
lead groups to fall short of their potential, including the temptation for members to expend less effort in a 
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group than they would have on their own (Kim, 2003, Williams and Karau, 1991), shortcomings in the 
extent to which groups uncover and discuss the information that might be held by just some of its 
members (Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995), coordination problems arising from caucusing or 
coalition behavior (Kim, 1997a, Mannix, 1993), and various reactions to member familiarity with the task 
and/or team (Gruenfeld et al., 1996, Kim, 1997b). Hence, much of the focus of this literature has been on 
how to help groups address these types of impediments to reach their potential. 
 
Yet for matters of judgment – such as evaluations of trustworthiness – where the information available 
does not enable a right or wrong answer, much less is known (Kerr & Tindale, 2004, p. 633). Research in 
this arena has tended to focus on the phenomenon of group polarization, which concerns the propensity 
for groups to be more extreme in their judgments than individuals (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). 
However, when considering the potential implications of this literature for trust repair, it remains far from 
clear what being “more extreme” would actually entail (i.e., in terms of the specific direction of that 
polarization, the conditions under which that polarization is more or less likely to arise, and the 
underlying mechanisms that might explain how and when it occurs). Indeed, careful examination of the 
groups literature reveals that even the most thorough accounts of how group judgments might differ from 
those of individuals are unable to address this issue. For example, in their review of the literature 
comparing the judgments of individuals and groups, Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1996) excluded from 
their analysis judgments in which normative standards of accuracy could not be established (see p. 690), 
such as the kinds of trust judgments currently under investigation. Moreover, even for the research they 
did review, they concluded that, “the relevant empirical literature reveals no clear or general pattern.” 
These authors make an important contribution by identifying a number of factors that may generally 
affect the relationship between these individual and group judgments, but their work as well as more 
recent observations by Kerr and Tindale (2004) also ultimately makes clear that it is only through closer 
scrutiny of the specific mechanisms underlying trust repair that we can develop clear predictions about 
how groups may differ from individuals after a violation. 
 
Mechanisms underlying trust repair 
Recent theoretical development in the trust repair literature can help shed light on these issues. Kim et al. 
(2009) conceptualized the repair of trust as a matter of resolving trustors’ and trustees’ discrepant views. 
More specifically, they argued that after trust is violated: (a) trustors are likely to advocate the belief that 
the trustee is untrustworthy, whereas (b) trustees are likely to promote the belief that greater trust is 
deserved, and that (c) the relative strength of these competing efforts determines whether trust repair is 
achieved (i.e., with the ultimate level of trust depending on the trustees’ efforts to promote the belief that 
trust is warranted outweighing the opposing efforts of their trustors). Because it takes into account both 
the trustor and trustee and attempts to integrate existing work, this conceptualization provides a useful 
foundation upon which to combine insights from the group polarization and trust repair literatures to 
determine whether and how the judgments of individuals and groups might differ after a trust violation. 
 
Inclinations of trustors 
As a starting point, Kim et al.’s (2009) analysis may be combined with insights from the group 
polarization literature to infer how groups might differ from individuals in general. These insights suggest 
 5 
 
 
that after a trust violation, the presence of multiple trustors (rather than just one) is likely to strengthen 
trustors’ negative views. More specifically, two major theoretical explanations have been offered for why 
group polarization can occur, persuasive argumentation and social comparison (see Isenberg (1986) for a 
review). Persuasive arguments theory highlights the notion that some individuals may not have 
considered arguments that have been considered by others, and that their interaction as a group can afford 
them exposure to these arguments and an opportunity to assess them on their merits. In contrast, social 
comparison theory suggests that people are motivated to be seen in a socially desirable light, such that in 
group discussions they may alter their opinions to be seen more favorably vis-à-vis their perceptions of 
the group’s tendencies and values. 
 
These mechanisms suggest that to the extent individuals each possess reasons not to trust a trustee, the 
opportunity to share these reasons with others in the group and recognize that others are similarly 
skeptical may serve to further decrease their trust as a collective. Indeed, this influence has been 
recognized by Durkheim (1886: 1973, pp. 172–173), who observed that: “To strengthen those sentiments 
which, if left to themselves, would soon weaken, it is sufficient to bring those who hold them together and 
to put them into closer and more active relations with one another…. The sentiments provoked by his 
words come back to him, but enlarged and amplified, and to this degree they strengthen his own 
sentiment.” These notions suggest that groups will be more extreme in their trust-related judgments than 
individuals following a violation and repair attempt, and that this extremity will involve groups exhibiting 
less trust. 
 
The role of trustees 
However, a sole focus on trustors provides an incomplete picture because it overlooks the critical role 
played by trustees in shaping trustors’ reactions (Kim et al., 2009). One of the most robust findings in the 
literature is that trustees can significantly influence trustors’ assessments, but the effect of a given 
response is contingent upon the type of violation (Dirks et al., 2011, Ferrin et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2004, 
Kim et al., 2006). This research is based on a schematic model of dispositional attribution (Reeder & 
Brewer, 1979), which suggests that there are fundamental differences in how people weigh information 
when making judgments about another’s competence (i.e., the extent to which one possesses the technical 
and interpersonal skills required for a job) vs. integrity (i.e., the extent to which one adheres to a set of 
principles that a perceiver finds acceptable), with competence and integrity representing two central 
trusting beliefs (McKnight et al., 1998). In particular, this model and ample supporting empirical evidence 
indicates that whereas people tend to weigh positive information about competence more heavily than 
negative information about competence, they tend to weigh negative information about integrity more 
heavily than positive information about integrity (e.g., Reeder et al., 2001, Reeder et al., 2002). 
 
Trustees may, therefore, capitalize on these attributional tendencies when repairing trust. Specifically, 
these differences have allowed researchers to predict and find support for a two-fold effect (Ferrin et al., 
2007, Kim et al., 2004). For matters of competence, trust is repaired more readily when trustees offer an 
apology (i.e., a response that conveys both guilt and repentance) rather than a denial (i.e., a response that 
conveys neither guilt nor repentance), given that the positive signals of intended redemption that might be 
conveyed by an apology (i.e., highly diagnostic positive information about competence) should outweigh 
the negative effects of this response confirming guilt (i.e., less diagnostic negative information about 
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competence). However, for matters of integrity, trust repair is encumbered when trustees offer an apology 
rather than a denial, given that an apology would then be considered to offer a reliable signal that one 
lacks integrity (i.e., highly diagnostic negative information about integrity) which should outweigh any 
positive effects from this response’s signal of intended redemption (i.e., less diagnostic positive 
information about integrity). Thus, this research suggests that it is relatively “effective” to repair a 
competence-based violation with an apology and an integrity-based violation with a denial, whereas it is 
relatively “ineffective” to repair an integrity-based violation with an apology and a competence-based 
violation with a denial. Indeed, the robustness of this finding (across settings, despite evidence regarding 
innocence vs. guilt, and for different types of populations) (Ferrin et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2004) suggests 
that this interaction may also be found when trustees attempt to repair trust with a group. That is, we 
expect that a trustee’s attempts to repair trust with a group will be less effective when they deny 
culpability (rather than apologize) for competence-based violations or apologize (rather than deny 
culpability) for integrity-based violations, just as these responses have been found to be less effective 
when directed at solitary individuals. 
 
Combined implications 
Yet, by integrating these insights regarding the inclinations of trustors and the role of trustees, we can 
ultimately develop a more refined account of how individuals’ and groups’ trust judgments might differ 
than when considering either perspective alone. That is, rather than simply expect trust repair to be more 
difficult to achieve with groups than individuals overall or expect both individuals and groups to exhibit 
similar levels of trust based on the type of violation and response, one might expect that the relative level 
of trust repair achieved with individuals vs. groups will also depend on this interaction (i.e., such that, in 
some cases, groups’ lack of trust relative to individuals will be reduced or even magnified based on the 
type of violation and the type of response). This possibility arises from the notion that, rather than simply 
induce groups to resist the repair attempts of trustees, group polarization may influence the collective 
decision-making process by acting as a lever that magnifies whatever inclinations individuals would have 
exhibited on their own. If so, both the negative implications of offering an “ineffective” response to a 
trust violation (i.e., by denying culpability for a competence-based violation or apologizing for an 
integrity-based violation) and the positive implications of offering an “effective” response to a trust 
violation (i.e., by apologizing for a competence-based violation or denying culpability for an integrity-
based violation) should be magnified in groups, resulting in lower and higher trust levels respectively, 
relative to individuals. Hence, by integrating the phenomenon of group polarization with the schematic 
attribution processes identified in existing trust repair research, we predict that groups will be less trusting 
than individuals after an ineffective response, but more trusting than individuals after an effective 
response, is offered for an alleged transgression. 
Hypothesis 1 
Groups will exhibit less trust than individuals after an ineffective response, but greater trust than 
individuals after an effective response, has been offered for an alleged transgression. 
 
 
Moreover, if these effects are indeed the result of group polarization, they should be reflected in the types 
of arguments and/or normative concerns that are expressed when groups make their decisions. As 
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previously mentioned, to the extent that the two major explanations that have been offered for group 
polarization, persuasive arguments and social comparison (Isenberg, 1986), can explain why individuals 
and groups might differ after an alleged trust violation, the lower (higher) trust of groups relative to 
individuals should be mediated by the extent to which arguments are expressed against (in favor of) the 
trustee and/or the extent to which members feel normative pressure to be against (in favor of) the trustee, 
respectively. For example, according to persuasive arguments theory, when the aggregate stance of 
individuals is to (dis)trust after a violation and repair attempt, the group discussion would subsequently 
involve a higher number of arguments to (dis)trust, pushing the group to be more extreme in their final 
judgment (due to hearing arguments they had not considered or hearing the same argument from many 
people, making it seem more valid). Likewise, for normative influence, the initial stance of individuals 
may shape the group process, such that group members end up more extreme in their stance as a result of 
the group discussion creating felt pressure to exhibit greater (dis)trust than as individuals. 
Hypothesis 2a 
The lower (higher) trust of groups relative to individuals will be mediated by the expression of persuasive 
arguments. 
 
Hypothesis 2b 
The lower (higher) trust of groups relative to individuals will be mediated by the extent to which 
members feel normative pressure. 
 
 
Finally, in organizational settings, trust judgments are seldom ‘purely’ individual or collective. Rather, 
group assessments are often made by members who have already performed their own individual 
assessments, or members may form their own individual assessments after having participated in, and 
having reflected upon, an earlier group assessment. To the extent that this occurs, it seems important to 
explore how initially performing one mode of assessment (individual or group) would ultimately affect 
the other, since this might offer further insight into the conditions under which the individual vs. group 
differences under investigation might arise. This examination may also help elucidate the group 
polarization mechanisms in operation since, as we will articulate below, the predicted effects of 
persuasive arguments processes for sequential judgments differ from the predicted effects of social 
comparison processes. 
 
Research on the temporal sequencing of individual and group decisions has focused mainly on the effects 
of prior individual consideration on subsequent group decisions and finds that prior consideration can, in 
fact, influence the group’s decision. For decision tasks in which a demonstrably correct answer exists, 
prior consideration of incomplete information by individuals can often lead to ineffective group decisions 
(Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003). And, for judgment tasks, prior consideration tends to be similarly 
problematic, with groups being more prone to bias if individuals have given the issue prior consideration 
(Milch et al., 2009, Moon et al., 2003). Thus, we extend the logic underlying persuasive argumentation 
and social comparison processes to predict two alternative patterns of temporal effects based on which 
process (persuasive arguments or normative pressure) plays a more critical role. 
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To the extent that persuasive arguments theory represents the critical mechanism underlying our findings, 
exposure to arguments from others should provide greater information and certainty than what individuals 
might hold on their own. Thus, individuals exposed to persuasive arguments in a group after making their 
own initial individual assessments should shift toward the group’s assessment because fellow group 
members’ persuasive arguments would provide additional information beyond that originally considered 
by the individual. However, the reverse would not be true; individuals making individual assessments 
after being exposed to persuasive arguments in a group will not have any additional information in the 
individual context than they had in the group context. This logic, therefore, suggests that whereas initial 
individual assessments will be significantly altered by the subsequent assessments of groups, initial group 
assessments will persist by anchoring the subsequent assessments of individuals. 
Hypothesis 3a 
Initial individual assessments will be altered by subsequent group assessments, but initial group 
assessments will persist by anchoring the subsequent assessments of individuals. 
 
 
Alternatively, to the extent that social comparison theory can account for the individual vs. group 
differences that are found, and people are simply altering their opinions to be seen more favorably by 
their group, then there is less reason to expect that the normative influences that would exist in the group 
setting would persist to affect individuals’ assessments once they are on their own. Thus, individuals 
exposed to normative pressures in a group after making their own initial individual assessments should 
respond by shifting toward the group’s assessment due to social comparison processes. And the reverse 
should also be true; individuals making their own initial individual assessments after being exposed to 
normative pressures in a group should be liberated to alter their subsequent individual assessment because 
the normative pressures would be removed. This logic suggests that just as initial individual assessments 
will be altered by subsequent group assessments, initial group assessments will be altered by subsequent 
individual assessments. 
Hypothesis 3b 
Initial individual assessments will be altered by subsequent group assessments, and initial group 
assessments will be altered by subsequent individual assessments. 
 
 
Method 
To pursue this investigation in a manner that would control for the type of trust violation and response for 
both groups and individuals, as well as ensure the comparability of those who would respond individually 
vs. in a group, we conducted a large-scale laboratory experiment. This study implemented a 2 (violation 
type: competence vs. integrity) × 2 (violation response: apology vs. denial) × 2 (decision format: 
individual decision vs. group decision) × 2 (decision order: individual first vs. group first) mixed-factorial 
design. The first two and fourth factors were manipulated between-subjects, whereas the third factor was 
manipulated within-subjects. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions. 
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Participants 
Six hundred seventy-three undergraduate students from several introductory organizational behavior 
courses participated in this study for course credit. Participants averaged 20 years of age and 2.3 years of 
part-time work experience; 58% were male. Of these participants, 276 (41%) were Caucasian, 223 (33%) 
were East Asian, 47 (7%) were Hispanic, 34 (5%) were South Asian (e.g., India, Pakistan), 15 (2%) were 
African–American, 75 (11%) indicated Other, 1 was Native American, and 2 did not report ethnicity. 
 
Task 
Participants were given materials that asked them to assume the role of a manager who was in charge of 
hiring, and subsequently managing, a senior-level tax accountant. If hired, the candidate would be offered 
a 1-year contract because it was the policy of the firm to employ all Senior Tax Accountants under 1-year 
contracts with renewal contingent upon annual performance evaluations. Participants were told that, to 
expedite the hiring process, a recruiter from the firm had already interviewed the applicants and that these 
interviews had been videotaped and transcribed so participants could quickly and conveniently assess the 
applicant pool. Participants were then given the transcript for one of these interviews and shown the 
accompanying video clip so they could provide their own evaluation of the applicant. After watching the 
interview, participants completed a questionnaire. Each participant responded to this questionnaire twice, 
once as an individual and once as a member of a decision-making group (although the ordering of the 
individual vs. group decision varied as a within-subjects factor, as described below), with each 
assessment occurring immediately after the other. At the end of the study, each participant also completed 
a follow-up survey that assessed the group’s process for the group decision and obtained demographic 
information. 
 
Manipulations 
Four versions of this interview were filmed in a private office with a video crew and actors in accordance 
with the between-subjects factors of our experimental design. The bulk of each version contained 
identical video footage (brief introductions, some minor small talk, a request to videotape the interview, 
and a discussion of the candidate’s interest in the firm and job qualifications); only the 2-min segments 
containing the two between-subjects manipulations differed. Near the end of the approximately 10 min 
long interview, the recruiter disclosed to the job applicant that she had contacted some of the applicant’s 
references from the previous employer and that these references informed the recruiter that the applicant 
had been involved in an accounting-related transgression in her previous job. The framing of, and 
response to, this accusation represented the trust violation and repair attempt.4 The manipulations for 
decision format and decision order were derived from the protocol as described below. 
 
Violation-type 
The trust violation was framed as either a competence- or integrity-related matter consistent with the 
conceptual definitions of competence and integrity presented in the trust literature (Mayer Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995). In both conditions, the job applicant was accused of filing an incorrect tax return that 
understated a client’s capital gains income. In the competence condition, the job applicant was accused of 
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filing the incorrect return due to inadequate knowledge of the relevant tax codes. Specifically, the 
recruiter in the video recounted a conversation with co-workers from the applicant’s previous firm who 
were called as references: “…they said that you had been asked to resign as a result of incorrectly 
preparing a tax return for one of your former firm’s wealthier clients. In fact, they said it was because you 
had inadequate knowledge of relevant tax codes.” In the integrity condition, the job applicant was accused 
of filing the incorrect return intentionally: “…they said that you had been asked to resign as a result of 
incorrectly preparing a tax return for one of your former firm’s wealthier clients. In fact, they said you 
intentionally underreported your client’s capital gains earnings.” In both cases, the information was 
hearsay. The recruiter did not have evidence of the candidate’s guilt or innocence. 
 
Violation-response 
Immediately after the violation was mentioned, the candidate attempted to repair trust by either 
apologizing or denying responsibility for the act in question. In the apology condition, the candidate 
admitted full responsibility, promised that she would not let it happen again, and stated that the firm 
would not have any concerns about her competence/integrity if she were hired. In the denial condition, the 
candidate stated that the allegation was false (i.e., that an incorrect return had not been filed), attributed 
the allegation to bad office politics at the previous firm, and stated that the firm would not have any 
concerns about her competence/integrity if she were hired. 
 
Decision format 
Participants submitted their reactions to the interview via questionnaire twice. In the individual decision 
condition, each participant responded to the questionnaire on his or her own. In the group decision 
condition, the participants were placed in groups of 3–6 members and asked to discuss the videotaped 
interview for 5 min before completing the questionnaire as a group.5 The items in the group and 
individual questionnaires were identical. 
 
Decision order 
Half of the participants completed the questionnaire individually before completing the questionnaire as a 
group (i.e., the “individual first” condition). The remaining participants completed the questionnaire as a 
group before completing the questionnaire individually (i.e., the “group first” condition). Regardless of 
ordering, the instructions on the second questionnaire emphasized that revising their initial responses was 
acceptable. For example, participants in the “individual first” condition received the following 
instructions on the subsequent group questionnaire, “Although you had the opportunity to assess the 
candidate individually, it is possible your individual assessment may or may not reflect your group’s 
collective opinions. Hence, we would like you to tell us what your group’s evaluations of this job 
candidate would be – realizing that these assessments may or may not be similar to your individual 
evaluations.” Participants in the “group first” condition received analogous instructions for their 
individual questionnaire. 
 
Measures 
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We assessed participants’ reactions to the job candidate with measures that have been commonly used in 
the trust repair literature. These include assessments of the candidate’s competence and integrity, as well 
as the intention to hire the candidate for the position. The competence and integrity scales measure 
trusting beliefs (i.e., perceived trust-relevant qualities of the trustee), whereas the hiring decision 
represents a trusting intention (i.e., willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another in the presence of 
risk) (McKnight et al., 1998). We also included items in the follow-up survey to assess the mediators. 
 
Perceived competence 
Three items assessing perceptions of the applicant’s (Ballou’s) competence were drawn from Kim et al. 
(2004): (1) Ballou is very capable of performing her job, (2) Ballou has much knowledge about the work 
that needs to be done on the job, and (3) I feel very confident in Ballou’s skills. Respondents rated these 
items on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree; 7 = strongly disagree). 
 
Perceived integrity 
Similar to the competence scale, three items assessing perceptions of the job applicant’s integrity were 
also drawn from Kim et al. (2004): (1) I like Ballou’s values, (2) Sound principles seem to guide Ballou’s 
behavior, and (3) Ballou has a great deal of integrity, using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree; 7 = 
strongly disagree). 
 
Hiring intention 
To capture participants’ trusting intentions in a manner specific to the context of this study, we asked 
participants to rate the likelihood that they would hire the job applicant on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
definitely; 7 = definitely not). This item was reverse-scored. 
 
Persuasive arguments 
The extent to which arguments were expressed in favor of vs. against the alleged transgressor during the 
group discussion was assessed using four items: (1) During the course of the discussion, to what extent 
did you speak in favor of Ballou? (2) During the course of the discussion, to what extent did other 
members of the group speak in favor of Ballou? (3) During the course of the discussion, to what extent 
did you speak against Ballou? (reverse-scored), and (4) During the course of the discussion, to what 
extent did other members of the group speak against Ballou? (reverse-scored). Respondents rated these 
items on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 7 = frequently). 
 
Normative pressure 
The extent to which participants felt normative pressure from their group to alter their opinions was 
assessed using two items drawn from Kaplan and Miller (1987): (1) How much pressure did you feel to 
agree with the decision of the group? and (2) How much pressure did you feel not to express your true 
opinions in the deliberation? Respondents rated these items on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = no pressure at 
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all; 7 = extremely strong pressure). A third scale item that was initially included was dropped as a result 
of the confirmatory factor analysis as reported below.6 
 
Supplemental study 
A supplemental study was also conducted to verify the internal validity of the between-subjects factors by 
examining three aspects of the stimulus materials. The first objective was to ascertain whether the 
operationalizations of apology and denial for the main study would differ in their signals of responsibility 
and regret, as we intended. The remaining objectives involved examining two factors that could serve as 
alternative explanations for the results: (1) the denial was accompanied by an explanation for the 
accusation (i.e., the specific reference to “bad office politics”) but the apology did not contain this 
information and (2) the four conditions might vary in terms of clarity (i.e., creating differences in 
ambiguity across conditions). 
 
To address these goals, we created a 2 (violation type: competence vs. integrity) × 3 (violation response: 
apology vs. denial with politics reference vs. denial without politics reference) between-subjects design, 
and randomly assigned participants to the study conditions. The 118 participants in the supplemental 
study were drawn from the same population as the primary study and, as with the primary study 
participants, received course credit for their participation. Demographics were similar, with participants 
averaging 20 years of age; 55% were male. The supplemental study was administered online with 
participants first reading a transcript corresponding to their study condition and then answering questions 
about it. 
 
First, we evaluated the content of the apology and denial responses. Consistent with their definitions, the 
apology manipulation was intended to communicate both responsibility and regret, while the denial 
response was intended to avoid signaling these two factors. Responsibility and regret were each measured 
using three item scales with acceptable levels of reliability (α = .91 and α = .83, respectively). As 
expected, apology signaled more responsibility than denial (MAPOL = 6.28 vs. MDENY = 2.84) and this 
difference was significant, F(1, 77) = 188.74, p = .000; η2 = .71. Apology also signaled more regret than 
denial (MAPOL = 4.72 vs. MDENY = 3.44) and this difference was significant, F(1, 77) = 22.16, p = 
.000, η2 = .22.7 
 
Next, we examined whether the specific reference to “bad office politics” in the operationalization of 
denial might affect our results. On a theoretical level, attribution theory suggests that dispositional and 
situational forces operate in a hydraulic fashion, such that as situational forces grow stronger, the role of 
the individual grows weaker (Kelley, 1973). Thus, based on their definitions, apologies should involve 
placing greater emphasis on the role of the individual than the situation, whereas denials should involve 
discounting the role of the individual in favor of the situation. In other words, whether the alleged trust 
violation is attributed to the person or some aspect of the situation is part of what inherently distinguishes 
an apology from a denial, and the reference to “bad office politics” in the denial simply explained why the 
allegation should be attributed to the situation rather than the person. We wanted to ensure, however, that 
the reference “bad office politics” used in this and prior studies’ manipulation of denial (Ferrin et al., 
2007, Kim et al., 2004) was not creating an unintended result. Thus, we assessed whether the implications 
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of denial vis-à-vis apology would differ depending on whether the reference to “bad office politics” had 
been included or not and found that the interactive effects of violation-type (competence vs. integrity) and 
violation response (apologies vs. denials) were virtually identical, irrespective of whether the reference to 
“bad office politics” had been included in the denial, Wilks’ Lambda = .73, F(3, 73) = 8.84, p < .0005; η2 
= .27, or had been completely removed, Wilks’ Lambda = .74, F(3, 73) = 8.38, p < .0005; η2 = .26. 
 
Finally, to determine whether the four between-subjects conditions in our main study were similarly clear 
in terms of the information provided (i.e., to confirm that our findings could not be attributed to some 
pairings of violation-type and violation-response simply being more ambiguous than others), we assessed 
differences in perceived ambiguity across the four conditions with a three-item scale (α = .76). There 
were no differences in ambiguity reported across different violation-types (integrity vs. competence), F(1, 
75) = .011, p = .916; η2 = .00. Moreover, although there were differences according to violation response 
(apology vs. denial), (MAPOL = 4.09 vs. MDENY = 4.55), F(1, 75) = 4.47, p = .038; η2 = .056, these 
differences were washed out when violation and response type were considered concurrently (which is the 
comparison of interest). The violation-type and response-type interaction was not significant for the 
ambiguity dependent measure, F(1, 75) = .033, p = .855; η2 = .000. 
 
In summary, this supplemental study provided confidence that (a) the apology and denial responses 
communicated the intended signals, (b) the reference to “bad office politics” in the denial, to explain the 
accusation, did not affect the results, and (c) our results are not attributable to differences in ambiguity. 
 
Results 
Three manipulation check questions were included on the group and individual questionnaires to assess 
whether participants recognized the nature of the violation (competence vs. integrity) and the response to 
the violation (apology vs. denial). The manipulation checks revealed that the manipulations were 
successful. Of the 169 groups, 142 answered all three questions correctly (84.0%), 24 (14.2%) missed one 
question, and 3 (1.8%) missed two questions. We included groups who answered all questions correctly, 
since this indicated they fully understood both the violation-type and violation-response manipulations 
contained in the video. Thus, the final sample size was 142 groups (570 participants).8 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, reliabilities, and inter-correlations for the study variables. Table 2 
reports variable means and standard deviations by condition. To assess convergent and discriminant 
validity of our measures, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) at the individual level of 
analysis of the five response scales for the individual survey (IS) and follow-up survey (which was also 
administered to individual respondents and aggregated). A CFA in which perceived integrity (3 items), 
perceived competence (3 items), hiring intention (single item), persuasive arguments (4 items), and 
normative pressure (3 items) were allowed to freely correlate indicated an adequate fit and supported 
convergent validity for a five-factor model (χ2(df = 68, N = 570) = 365.76, CFI = .93, NFI = .91, TLI = 
.89, RMSEA = .088. While all item-factor loadings were significant (p < .01), one normative pressure 
item loaded at only .27 and was therefore dropped. All other item-factor loadings were adequate (>|0.51|). 
Follow-up discriminant analyses (Bagozzi & Phillips, 1982) indicated that the hypothesized five-factor 
model fit the data significantly better than any of the more parsimonious models, providing evidence of 
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the discriminant validity of the five-factor model. For example, the five factor model fit significantly 
better than a comparison four-factor model with the correlation between persuasive arguments and hiring 
set to 1.0, χ2(69, N = 570) = 724.65, CFI = .84, NFI = .83, TLI = .76, RMSEA = .129, Δχ2(df = 1, N = 
570) = 358.89, p < .001. We also conducted a CFA of the three group-level response scales for the group 
survey (GS). Perceived integrity (3 items), perceived competence (3 items), and hiring (single item) were 
again allowed to freely correlate with each other and indicated a good fit for a three-factor model (χ2(df = 
12, N = 142) = 12.56, CFI = 1.00, NFI = .98, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = .018, all item-factor loadings >|0.76| 
(p < .001). 
 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and inter-correlations. 
 
 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations by condition. 
 
 
Except for Hypotheses 2a and 2b (involving mediation), we used MANOVA to analyze the data. 
MANOVA is an appropriate analytic technique for the current study because (1) we are testing 
differences in means across categories for a collection of outcome variables that are conceptually, and in 
all likelihood empirically, related, and (2) we are not making different predictions among the outcome 
variables. For multiple related outcome variables, ANOVA is not considered a viable strategy because the 
“multiple ANOVA F tests are not independent” (Huberty & Morris, 1989, p. 306). That said, since 
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MANOVA output does not specify the direction of any noted differences between categories (e.g., as a 
positive or negative beta would in regression), we also report means for the outcome measures across the 
comparison conditions. As these patterns of means will reveal, the results for perceived competence 
offered far less support for our predictions than those for the other dependent measures. 
 
Time 1 comparisons 
To compare individual and group judgments in a manner that could rule out the influence of prior 
experience, we first compared the responses of individuals in the “individual first” condition (i.e., at time 
1) to those of groups in the “group first” condition (i.e., at time 1) with a 2 (violation type: competence vs. 
integrity) × 2 (violation response: apology vs. denial) × 2 (decision format: individual decision vs. group 
decision) MANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of violation-type, Wilks’ Lambda = 
.31, F(3, 132) = 99.93, p < .001; η2 = .694, as well as a significant main effect of violation-response, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .92, F(3, 132) = 3.66, p < .05; η2 = .077. As expected, perceived competence was lower 
when the violation concerned matters of competence (M = 4.77) rather than integrity (M = 5.91), and 
perceived integrity was lower when the violation concerned matters of integrity (M = 3.39) rather than 
competence (M = 4.89). 
 
As discussed previously, we expected a general effect of polarization such that groups would report lower 
trust than individuals. To examine this effect, we interpreted the significance and direction of the decision 
format manipulation. The MANOVA revealed a significant main effect for decision format, Wilks’ 
Lambda = .90, F(3, 132) = 5.13, p < .01; η2 = .104. As expected, groups were generally less trusting than 
individuals, with groups reporting lower perceived integrity (3.87 vs. 4.42), perceived competence (5.25 
vs. 5.44), and hiring intentions (4.13 vs. 4.78). 
 
Next, given that we expected trustees to be viewed more harshly (by both groups and individuals) when 
they denied culpability rather than apologized for competence-based violations, but apologized rather 
than denied culpability for integrity-based violations, we interpreted the significance and pattern of the 
violation-type × violation-response interaction. The MANOVA revealed that the violation-type × 
violation-response interaction was significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .50, F(3, 132) = 43.51, p < .001; η2 = 
.497.9 The means for perceived integrity and hiring intentions demonstrated the expected pattern and are 
illustrated in Fig. 1. The patterns reveal that when the violation concerned matters of competence, denial 
elicited harsher assessments than an apology. However, when the violation concerned matters of integrity, 
an apology elicited harsher assessments than a denial. The means for perceived competence did not reflect 
an interaction since there was almost no variation across response types. This finding for perceived 
competence is consistent with prior empirical research using the same set of dependent measures (Ferrin 
et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2006), as we will explain in the Discussion. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Post-hoc subgroup analysis for the effects of violation type and violation response on perceived 
integrity and hiring intention. 
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We then tested Hypothesis 1’s prediction that groups would be less trusting than individuals when an 
ineffective response has been offered for the alleged trust violation (i.e., by apologizing for an integrity-
based violation or denying culpability for a competence-based violation) but more trusting than 
individuals when an effective response has been offered for the alleged violation (i.e., by apologizing for 
a competence-based violation or denying culpability for an integrity-based violation), by interpreting the 
three-way interaction of the above factors. The MANOVA revealed that the decision format × violation-
type × violation-response interaction was significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .92, F(3, 132) = 3.90, p < .01; η2 
= .081. 
 
Consistent with our findings above, the pattern of means for the perceived integrity and hiring intention 
dependent measures reflected a similar interaction pattern, whereas the pattern of means for the perceived 
competence dependent measure exhibited minimal variance across response type and decision format. 
The pattern of means for perceived integrity and hiring intentions are illustrated in Fig. 2a, Fig. 2b. To 
clarify the significance of these group-individual differences within the three-way interaction, we 
conducted post-hoc MANOVAs by splitting the data according to whether an effective vs. ineffective 
response had been offered. As predicted, groups reported lower trust than individuals when there was a 
ineffective match between violation-type and violation-response and this difference was significant, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .75, F(3, 63) = 6.86, p < .01; η2 = .25. In contrast, groups were expected to be more 
trusting than individuals if trustees offered an effective response, but this difference was not significant, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .96, F(3, 71) = 1.03, p = .38; η2 = .04. 
 
 
Fig. 2a. Post-hoc subgroup analysis for the effects of decision format on perceived integrity and hiring 
intention after a competence violation. 
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Fig. 2b. Post-hoc subgroup analysis for the effects of decision format on perceived integrity and hiring 
intention after an integrity violation. 
 
 
On the whole, these findings suggest that the tendency for groups to be less trusting than individuals after 
a repair attempt is even more robust than anticipated. That said, the fact that groups were significantly 
less trusting than individuals after an ineffective response but this effect disappeared after an effective 
response provides at least general support for Hypothesis 1. 
 
Mediation analyses 
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, which predicted that differences in trust between individuals and groups 
would be driven by persuasive argumentation and normative pressure, we conducted mediation analyses 
by using the individual and group assessments in the “individual first” condition (time 1 individuals vs. 
time 2 groups). This condition was most appropriate for the mediation analyses for two reasons. First, the 
assessment of individuals and groups in the “individual first” condition represents a within-subjects 
comparison – the same participants completed the questionnaire individually before doing so as a group 
and then reported on their group experience in the follow-up survey. This allowed the use of group 
process information that would not have been relevant for the between-subjects comparisons of time 1 
individuals and time 1 groups used to test Hypothesis 1. Second, the results from this within-subjects 
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comparison of time 1 individuals vs. time 2 groups were virtually identical to those from the between-
subjects comparisons of time 1 individuals vs. time 1 groups (see “Temporal dynamics” below). This not 
only demonstrates the robustness of the individual vs. group differences we have reported, but also helps 
justify our use of the within-subjects comparison to understand why such individual vs. group differences 
would arise. 
 
For the mediation analyses, individuals’ aggregated responses for each of the primary measures 
(perceived competence, perceived integrity, and hiring intention) served as the independent variable and 
the corresponding group assessment on each measure served as the dependent variable. Measures of the 
mediators were also aggregated to the group level for analysis.10 We tested Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
simultaneously in a multiple mediator model estimated via bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This 
multiple mediator methodology has certain advantages compared to the traditional causal steps approach 
(i.e., Baron & Kenny, 1986), including the ability to: (1) specify and test a single model with both 
proposed mediators rather than separate models for each, (2) compare the ability of each variable to 
mediate while controlling for the other, (3) include covariates rather than splitting data into subsamples, 
(4) relax assumptions of normality, and (5) generate more reliable results with smaller samples. Groups 
across all four conditions were included in the analysis for each of the three primary measures. Since the 
group-individual difference in the ineffective response conditions was mitigated in the effective response 
conditions, we included a covariate for effective response. Table 3 reports the results of these tests. 
 
Table 3. Mediation of groups’ greater harshness or leniency relative to individuals. 
 
SE, Standard error; BCa, bias corrected and accelerated; 5000 bootstrap samples. ⁎⁎ p < .01. 
 
The first row reports the total effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable (i.e., the X → 
Y relationship). The significant coefficients indicate that the individual ratings significantly predict the 
group ratings for all three variables of interest. The second row reports the direct effects of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable, which are all still significant but smaller in magnitude 
than the total effect for each of the three variables. The difference between the total and direct effects is 
the total indirect effect of the mediators as a pair. This total indirect effect is significant for perceived 
integrity and hiring intentions as evidenced by the fact that the 95% confidence interval does not include 
zero. The total indirect effect of the mediators is not significant, however, for perceived competence. 
These results reveal that persuasive argumentation and normative pressure mediate the effects for 
perceived integrity and hiring intentions, but the total indirect effect does not specify whether one or both 
mediators are responsible. 
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Thus, to evaluate Hypotheses 2a and 2b, the specific indirect effects of each mediator must be considered. 
Again, this requires examination of the confidence intervals. If the interval for the specific indirect effect 
does not include zero, then we can conclude the construct mediates the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. Persuasive argumentation, thus, mediates the relationship for 
perceived integrity and hiring intentions, but not perceived competence. Normative pressure, in contrast, 
does not mediate any of these relationships. These findings support Hypothesis 2a but not 2b. 
 
Temporal dynamics 
Finally, to test the predictions of Hypotheses 3a and 3b regarding whether prior individual (group) trust 
appraisals would be affected by the subsequent assessments of groups (individuals), we examined 
whether the individual vs. group differences in trust noted above would be affected by how the decision 
process is managed (i.e., the ordering or timing of the decision) and the format used (i.e., individual vs. 
group). Specifically, we investigated two questions: (1) whether initial individual assessments would be 
altered by subsequent group assessments and (2) whether initial group assessments would by altered by 
subsequent individual assessments. If initial individual trust assessments are altered by subsequent group 
assessments, but not the reverse, then Hypothesis 3a is supported. If both types of initial trust assessment 
are altered by the subsequent assessment, then Hypothesis 3b is supported. 
 
Individuals → groups 
Since the “individual first” condition measured individuals’ reactions (at time 1) and then their group 
reactions (at time 2), we looked within this condition to see whether initial individual assessments would 
be altered by subsequent group assessments. We used repeated measures MANOVA to analyze the data, 
because the comparison of individuals (at time 1) with groups (at time 2) represents a within-subjects 
comparison. The MANOVA revealed a significant main effect for time, Wilks’ Lambda = .62, F(3, 68) = 
14.18, p < .001; η2 = .385. Consistent with prior analyses, groups (at time 2) were less trusting than 
individuals (at time 1), with groups reporting lower perceptions of integrity (MT1 indivs = 4.42 vs. MT2 
groups = 3.92), competence (MT1 indivs = 5.44 vs. MT2 groups = 5.39), and hiring intentions (MT1 
indivs = 4.78 vs. MT2 groups = 4.68). 
 
We also examined the time × violation-type × violation-response interaction from this analysis to evaluate 
whether the tendency for groups to be much less trusting than individuals after an ineffective response 
compared to an effective response would be found after groups had made initial individual assessments. 
The repeated measures MANOVA revealed that this interaction was significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .84, 
F(3, 68) = 4.31, p < .01; η2 = .160. Although the means for perceived competence are not supportive, the 
means for perceived integrity and hiring intention in this three-way interaction are very similar to those 
from the individuals (at time 1) vs. groups (at time 1) comparison reported earlier (see Table 4). Thus, 
both the general tendency for groups to be less trusting than individuals and the dependence of that 
polarization on whether an effective or ineffective response has been offered (Hypothesis 1) occurred in 
groups after they made initial individual trust judgments. 
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Table 4. Post-hoc means comparison of the three-way interaction for perceived integrity and hiring 
intention. 
 
Finally, to explore whether initial individual assessments would in any way mitigate the effects of making 
assessments in a group, we compared groups in which members have not conducted a prior individual 
assessment (time 1 groups) with those that have (time 2 groups). For this comparison, we used standard 
MANOVA to analyze the data because we are examining between-subjects, rather than within-subjects, 
differences. The MANOVA indicated no significant main effect for decision order, Wilks’ Lambda = .96, 
F(3, 132) = 2.05, n.s.; η2 = .044. Groups had similar levels of trust for the trustee, regardless of whether 
they had assessed the candidate individually prior to the group assessment. Moreover, the three way 
interaction for decision order × violation-type × violation-response interaction was also non-significant, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F(3, 132) = 0.81, n.s.; η2 = .018. These findings reveal that initial individual 
assessments exerted little influence on the subsequent assessments of groups. 
 
Groups → individuals 
Since the “group first” condition measured groups’ reactions (at time 1) followed by participants’ 
individual reactions (at time 2), we then looked within this condition to see whether initial trust 
assessments made in a group would be altered by subsequent individual assessments. We used repeated 
measures MANOVA for this within-subjects comparison, and found a significant main effect for time, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .86, F(3, 62) = 3.30, p < .05; η2 = .138. Individuals (at time 2) were less trusting than 
groups (at time 1), with individuals reporting lower perceived competence (MT2 indivs = 5.04 vs. MT1 
groups = 5.25). This main effect suggests that, rather than revert back to how they might have initially 
assessed the trustee as individuals, the harsher initial group assessment (relative to what would have been 
observed by individuals at time 1) became an anchor that was then magnified by the individuals when 
they subsequently made assessments on their own (at time 2). However, the MANOVA result for time 
appears to be driven by the perceived competence outcome measure, since the means for perceived 
integrity and hiring intention hardly varied across time (perceived integrity: MT2 indivs = 3.86 vs. MT1 
groups = 3.87; hiring intention: MT2 indivs = 4.18 vs. MT1 groups = 4.13). This repeated measures 
MANOVA, furthermore, revealed a significant three-way time × violation-type × violation-response 
interaction, Wilks’ Lambda = .80, F(3, 62) = 5.23, p < .01; η2 = .202, which suggests that the tendency 
for individuals to be more lenient than groups after an ineffective response dissipates if they made an 
initial group assessment and provides further support for the notion that members anchored on the harsher 
initial group assessment when making subsequent assessments as individuals (see Table 4). 
 
Finally, we evaluated whether making a trust assessment initially as part of a group would affect 
subsequent individual assessments by comparing individuals who have not been part of a prior group 
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assessment (time 1 individuals) with those who have (time 2 individuals). A standard MANOVA was 
appropriate for this between-subjects comparison. This analysis revealed a highly significant main effect 
for decision order, Wilks’ Lambda = .94, F(3, 558) = 13.01, p < .001; η2 = .065. Means indicate that 
individuals (at time 1) reported more trust than individuals (at time 2) by noting higher perceptions of 
competence (MT1 indivs = 5.23 vs. MT2 indivs = 5.03), perceptions of integrity (MT1 indivs = 4.39 vs. 
MT2 indivs = 3.86), and hiring intentions (MT1 indivs = 4.75 vs. MT2 indivs = 4.19). This MANOVA, 
furthermore, revealed a significant three-way decision order × violation-type × violation-response 
interaction, Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F(3, 558) = 3.14, p < .05; η2 = .017. The means for perceived 
competence were again not supportive of this interaction, but the means for perceived integrity and hiring 
were. As reported in Table 4, individuals at time 2 always report lower perceived integrity and hiring 
intentions than individuals at time 1 and, notably, the extent of the differences between them was also 
affected by whether an effective or ineffective response was offered. After ineffective responses, the 
mean differences between time 1 and time 2 individuals ranged from .62 to .90 (with time 2 individuals as 
less trusting). Although time 2 individuals still reported lower perceived integrity and hiring intentions 
than time 1 individuals after effective responses, the harshness of their ratings dissipated, reducing the 
differences in means between time 1 and time 2 individuals (Mdiff ranged from .11 to .44). This evidence 
provides further support for the notion that individuals who had made prior group assessments anchored 
on this harsher group evaluation when making subsequent assessments as individuals. 
 
Summary 
Both Hypotheses 3a and 3b predicted that individuals would revise their trust assessments when 
responding later as part of a group (the individual → group condition). This tendency is supported by the 
significant repeated measures MANOVA results for the “individual first” condition. The comparison of 
groups (at time 1) and groups (at time 2), then, further corroborated this finding. Since no difference was 
found across groups regardless of whether prior individual discussion had taken place, it appears that 
individuals revised their trust assessments when under subsequent group influence. 
 
Next, to differentiate support for Hypothesis 3a vs. 3b, we needed to determine whether initially 
participating in a group decision would anchor individual responses (supporting 3a) or whether 
individuals would revert back to their initial tendencies, usually towards more leniency than groups 
(supporting 3b). Results from the “groups first” condition indicate significant differences between groups 
(at time 1) and individuals (at time 2) with individuals (at time 2) offering even harsher assessments than 
their initial groups. Thus, it appears that individuals anchored on their groups’ initial tendencies when 
later judging alone. This tendency is further illustrated when comparing individuals with and without 
prior group discussion (time 1 vs. time 2 individuals). Exposure to group discussion led individuals to be 
much less trusting. Again, the group discussion effect lingers even when individuals are no longer in the 
group. 
 
In sum, these results reveal that prior individual trust assessments were significantly altered by 
subsequent group assessments, but prior group assessments lingered to affect the subsequent trust 
assessments of individuals. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 3a over Hypothesis 3b. 
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Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate how the repair of trust might differ with individuals vs. 
groups and the conditions under which such differences might arise. This research can be seen as part of a 
broader, and much needed, effort to better situate the study of trust repair into the realm of organizations. 
The vast majority of trust repair research has taken an extremely focused approach, by studying 
interactions between a trustor and trustee as isolated individuals. In reality, virtually all organizationally-
related trust judgments (repair or otherwise) are made in a social context (e.g., Ferrin, Dirks, & Shah, 
2006). In this regard, the present study’s efforts to assess the influence of group context on trust repair 
have allowed us to identify several notable effects. 
 
As expected, trust was generally more difficult to repair with groups than individuals. Moreover, both 
groups and individuals were less trusting when trustees denied culpability (rather than apologized) for a 
competence-based violation or apologized (rather than denied culpability) for an integrity-based violation. 
However, the results ultimately reveal that the relative levels of trust reported by groups vs. individuals 
also depended on this interaction. Specifically, groups were less trusting than individuals when trustees 
offered an ineffective response (i.e., denying culpability for a competence-based violation or apologizing 
for an integrity-based violation), but this effect dissipated when trustees offered an effective response 
(i.e., apologizing for a competence-based violation or denying culpability for an integrity-based 
violation). Moreover, the extent to which groups were less trusting than individuals was mediated by the 
extent to which arguments in favor of vs. against the trustee had been expressed. As a result, whereas 
initial individual assessments of trust were significantly altered by subsequent group assessments, initial 
group assessments tended to persist by anchoring subsequent individual assessments. 
 
Theoretical implications 
These findings provide the basis for a number of theoretical contributions. For the trust repair literature, 
these results offer important insights by moving beyond its focus on the reactions of individuals to 
consider how those reactions would, or would not, differ for groups. The present study supports the 
notion that, in the aftermath of a trust violation, by increasing the number of trustors (i.e., by having those 
assessments made by groups rather than individuals) the balance of opposing forces in the negotiation of 
trust shifts to strengthen trustors’ inclinations to consider the trustee untrustworthy. Even further, the 
study provides additional support for the role of information diagnosticity in shaping these perceptions 
(Reeder & Brewer, 1979), not only by demonstrating that the same kinds of interactions between the type 
of violation and type of response that have been reported to affect the repair of trust with individuals 
(Ferrin et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2004) would generalize to groups, but also by revealing how the relative 
trust levels of groups vs. individuals can depend on this interaction as well. These findings, thus, 
underscore the importance of both framing (i.e., whether a violation is attributed to matters of competence 
vs. integrity) and context (i.e., whether trust is being judged by an individual vs. a group) for determining 
the efficacy of trust repair efforts. 
 
For the groups literature, although a substantial amount of research has been conducted, much uncertainty 
remains regarding the nature of their judgments (see Kerr and Tindale (2004) for a review). Moreover, the 
studies that have investigated group judgments have generally been limited to documenting the notion 
 23 
 
 
that groups, relative to individuals, can be more extreme (Hinsz et al., 1997). The present study, thus, 
contributes to this literature by offering insight into a particular type of group judgment (i.e., whether, and 
how much, to trust someone again). In doing so, we advance this literature by moving beyond more 
generic predictions that groups would be more extreme than individuals to provide a theoretical basis for 
predicting specific directions in which, as well as specific conditions under which, that greater extremity 
would occur in the context of trust violations. 
 
These findings can also help inform research on the group discontinuity effect, which indicates that, in the 
context of mixed-motive situations, relations between groups tend to be more competitive, or less 
cooperative, than relations between individuals (Insko, Schopler, Holyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990). This 
research suggests that the group discontinuity effect may at least in part be due to trust being lower in 
contexts involving groups than individuals. However, this literature has been based on how the relations 
between two groups vs. two individuals might differ, rather than on how a given individual might be 
treated by an individual vs. a group. For this reason, the trust mechanism underscored by the group 
discontinuity literature has been based on the notion that trust tends to be lower when the trustee happens 
to be a group than an individual, rather than on whether an individual trustee is being evaluated by an 
individual vs. group trustor. Moreover, even though researchers have recently shown that the group 
discontinuity effect can be extended to cases in which individuals vs. groups relate to a target individual 
(Meier & Hinsz, 2004), this research was focused on acts of aggression and simply referred to group 
polarization as a possible explanation for why this occurred. The present findings can, thus, contribute to 
this literature in several ways. It provides additional evidence that the group discontinuity effect can be 
extended to cases in which the target is an individual and the focal actor is either an individual or group. It 
suggests that these differences can be extended beyond matters of aggression to individual vs. group 
receptivity to trust repair attempts. It raises the possibility that differences in trust might help explain 
group discontinuity effects even when the target remains an individual. Finally, it highlights the need for 
research on group discontinuity to move beyond documenting this individual vs. group effect to consider 
when that difference might arise. 
 
Beyond these insights, this inquiry also offers implications for research on temporal dynamics. Prior 
research in this arena has identified a wide variety of ways in which past experience can meaningfully 
influence subsequent behavior (e.g., Gruenfeld and Hollingshead, 1993, Kim, 1997b, Kim et al., 2003, 
Kim et al., 2005, Milch et al., 2009, Moon et al., 2003). However, the disparate nature of those inquiries 
makes it difficult to identify a convergent set of insights that would explain how, for those experiencing a 
violation of trust, their reactions might be influenced when one mode of assessment (individual vs. group) 
is then followed by another. The current study overcomes this obstacle by extending the logic of 
persuasive arguments and social comparison theories, and the results ultimately underscore the 
importance of persuasive argumentation for this group polarization effect (i.e., by revealing that prior 
individual assessments were significantly altered by subsequent group assessments, but prior group 
assessments exerted lingering effects on subsequent individual assessments). 
 
Practical implications 
The present study, furthermore, offers several practical implications. At the most fundamental level, our 
study clearly demonstrates that trust judgments are not context free, but instead are biased by the social 
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processes through which they are generated. Groups were found to be harsher than individuals in judging 
trust worthiness after an alleged transgression. And this harshness is even further exacerbated when a 
trustee provides an ineffective response. Thus, managers and other organizational actors should bear in 
mind that, in the aftermath of an alleged trust violation, group decision processes are likely to deepen 
rather than dampen the negative trust judgments, which in turn could result in unjustly negative 
conclusions and lower chances of repair and reconciliation. In contrast, when trustees offer an effective 
response, the challenge posed by group decision processes appears to be mitigated. 
 
We also found that initial individual trust assessments exerted little influence on subsequent group 
assessments, but initial group trust assessments persisted by anchoring subsequent individual assessments. 
This result suggests that if a trustee plans to offer a response to a group that the trust repair literature has 
found to be ineffective, individual appeals before or after the group assessment are unlikely to help. 
Indeed, given that persuasive arguments mediated the aforementioned individual vs. group differences, 
perhaps the only options for trustees in such cases would be to find a way to limit the group discussion, or 
alternatively to participate in the group discussion in order to introduce persuasive arguments in their own 
favor. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
Despite these contributions, a number of questions remain unanswered by this study that future research 
might seek to explore. First, across our results, we found the predicted pattern of means for perceived 
competence far less frequently than we did for the other measures. This lack of findings for perceived 
competence is consistent with prior research using the same experimental paradigm (Ferrin et al., 2007, 
Kim et al., 2006). As documented in those earlier studies, the materials were carefully designed and 
pretested to avoid being biased toward issues of integrity vs. competence. Given these steps, and given 
that prior research has noted that these perceptions are independent (Mayer et al., 1995), it is not obvious 
why the results for perceived competence are less robust. One reason may be that, in the context chosen 
for our study, conclusions about competence may be less relevant than other trusting beliefs. Another 
possibility, given that people often view trust violations in a somewhat holistic manner, is that stronger 
effects for competence would be found if the transgression encouraged people to make cleaner 
distinctions about the type of trusting belief that had been violated. It is also possible that perceived 
competence is subject to cognitive processes that the schematic model of dispositional attribution cannot 
explain and that, for this reason, the theory needs to be amended. Overall, we recommend caution in 
interpreting the results for perceived competence and recommend future research to clarify the issue. 
 
A second issue that may be raised about the present methodology is that it has focused on trust violations 
in newly formed, rather than longer term, relationships. This focus should not raise concerns regarding 
whether initial levels of trust existed and had been subsequently violated, as prior studies that have used 
this methodology (Dirks et al., 2011, Ferrin et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2004) have offered clear evidence that 
initial trust levels were dramatically lowered by allegations of untrustworthy behavior. This focus on 
newly formed relationships should also not limit its relevance for managerial settings, given that a 
significant proportion of our business interactions tend to occur with those whom we have formed weak, 
rather than strong, ties (Granovetter, 1995). Readers, furthermore, should not conclude that studying 
newly formed relationships represents a weak test of trust repair, as evidence suggests that it may actually 
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be easier to repair trust in long-standing relationships, due to victims’ greater pro-relationship motivation 
(Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002). Nevertheless, the question of whether the mechanisms of 
trust repair that have been examined by this study might differ in relationships of longer duration is an 
important one that remains unanswered and deserves attention in future research. 
 
Third, although our results generally support the notion that persuasive argumentation would mediate the 
observed differences between individuals and groups, mediation by normative pressure was not found. It 
should be noted that our normative pressure scale was relatively low in terms of reliability, and this may 
have attenuated the results for this variable. Future research might, therefore, explore whether other 
measures of normative pressure would achieve different results. Moreover, additional mechanisms not 
assessed in the current research, such as the perceived magnitude of a violation, the extent to which the 
transgression is perceived as a threat, or the proliferation of emotions (Hatfield et al., 1994, Thompson 
and Kim, 2000), might help explain the individual vs. group differences that have been observed. These 
possibilities should not, however, detract from the fact that the kinds of inter-temporal effects we had 
observed would be quite difficult to explain without persuasive argumentation playing a more meaningful 
role than normative pressure, as the theoretical rationales for Hypotheses 3a and 3b described. 
 
Finally, one might explore whether the findings from this study would depend on different features of the 
group. Whereas the present inquiry has considered the implications of groups in the most generic sense, 
group differences in culture, diversity, longevity, geographical distribution, mode and synchrony of 
communication, and a host of other factors have been found to exert profound effects on their behavior. 
Such findings suggest that we may obtain additional insight into how individuals and groups might differ 
in their reactions to alleged transgressions by moving beyond the nature of groups as a general category to 
consider the type of group involved. One might also consider whether differences might arise if the 
trustee was male rather than female and whether this might depend on the group’s gender composition as 
well. 
 
Despite a burgeoning interest in the area of trust repair, research to date has not considered how trust 
judgments made by groups would differ from those made by individuals, the processes underlying such 
effects, or how such individual and group judgments might influence one another. By incorporating group 
polarization research into the trust literature, and examining the persuasive argumentation and social 
comparison processes that might drive such differences, this paper provides a valuable extension of the 
trust literature into a domain that is practically important but theoretically unexplored. 
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